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ABSTRACT	
	
	National	 administrative	 law	 traditions	 are	 changing	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 socio-economic	factors	and	the	Europeanisation	of	legal	norms.	To	illustrate	this	evolution	this	paper	discusses	the	roles	of	judges	in	three	European	major	transport	infrastructure	projects	in	England,	France	and	 Belgium	 where	 long-term	 public-private	 co-operation	 was	 developed	 and	 strong	 public	opposition	voiced.	Public-private	co-operation	to	develop	infrastructure	projects	is	not	new.	EU	financial	requirements	and	EU	procurement	directives,	though,	constrain	more	than	ever	how	these	public-private	co-operations	can	be	contractually	designed,	while	EU	sectoral	legislation	may	offer	new	opportunities	for	public-private	co-operation.	In	parallel,	citizens	are	entitled	to	be	involved	in	large	projects	affecting	the	environment	and	no	longer	mainly	seek	protection	for	their	 individual	 property	 rights.	 These	 changes	 illustrate	 the	 changing	 role	 of	 private	 parties	(economic	actors	and	citizens)	in	major	infrastructure	projects.	They	also	result	in	public	bodies	endorsing	an	increasingly	supervisory	and	monitoring	role	while	not	having	the	suitable	skills,	resources	 or	 information	 in-house	 to	 do	 so.	 These	 adaptations	 under	 the	 pressure	 of	 socio-economic	and	political	concerns	call	for	administrative	law	to	revisit	the	role	that	judges	play	in	adjudicating	issues	arising	from	these	complex	public-private	contracts,	where	public	bodies	and	private	 parties	 are	 locked	 together	 for	 a	 long	 term	 and	 where	 changing	 the	 relationship	 is	extremely	expensive	for	the	public	purse.					
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I. Introduction			2018,	18th	January,	Prime	Minister’s	Questions	(Westminster).	Following	the	announcement	that	Carillon,	a	UK	major	government’s	contractor,	has	gone	into	administration	the	Prime	Minister	replied	to	a	question	asked	by	Opposition	Leader	Jeremy	Corbyn:			 “[…]	the	Government’s	job	is	to	ensure	that	public	services	continue	to	be	provided	[…].	The	right	hon.	Gentleman	said	earlier	that	it	was	the	Government’s	job	to	ensure	that	Carillion	was	properly	managed,	but	we	were	a	customer	of	Carillion,	not	the	manager	of	Carillion	—	a	very	important	difference.	It	is	also	important	that	we	have	protected	taxpayers	from	an	unacceptable	bail-out	of	a	private	company”.2	
 This	 quote	 mirrors	 the	 questions	 surrounding	 the	 role	 of	 government	 when	 selecting	 and	monitoring	private	contractors	providing	public	services	and	infrastructures	whilst	preserving	taxpayers’	 money.	 The	 framework	within	which	 European	 governments	 decide	 to	 engage	 in	public-private	 co-operations	 to	 deliver	 services	 and	 infrastructures	 has	 evolved	 over	 time.	Comparative	law	reveals	how	strongly	public-private	co-operation	enabling	the	development	of	major	 infrastructures	(railways,	bridges,	 tunnels,	etc.)	and	 their	 judicial	 review	pertain	 to	 the	specificities	 of	 domestic	 administrative	 law.	 For	 instance,	 England	 and	 France	 are	 mirror	opposites	while	Belgium	offers	an	interesting	intermediary	system.	In	England	the	liberal	laissez-faire	of	the	19th	century	led	to	public-private	co-operation	being	regulated	mostly	through	private	law,	with	 little	 distinctive	 administrative	 law	 being	 developed	 by	 courts.	 By	 contrast,	 French	judges	developed	legal	principles	regulating	public	contracts	(e.g.	concessions)	at	the	turn	of	the	20th	 century,	 from	 which	 key	 administrative	 law	 principles	 were	 then	 derived.	 In	 Belgium	ordinary	 judges	 struggled	 for	 a	 long	 time	 to	 review	 decisions	 awarding	 concessions	 (e.g.	railways):	these	decisions	were	sovereign	acts	falling	outside	judicial	review.	Yet,	 judges	were	more	 comfortable	 adjudicating	 disputes	 arising	 from	 contractual	 performance,	 where	 they	applied	private	law.		This	historical	background	leaves	out	entrenched	features	in	domestic	administrative	law	and	how	major	investment	projects	involving	public-private	co-operation	are	developed	in	2018.	For	example,	 the	600	projects	 included	 in	 the	UK	National	 Infrastructure	Delivery	Plan	 for	2016-20213	need	to	meet	an	array	of	planning,	legal	or	budgetary	requirements	whose	roots	often	date	back	 to	 the	 19th	 century.	 Yet,	 these	major	 infrastructure	 projects	 are	 now	 also	part	 of	 global	investments.	 Multinational	 companies	 compete	 to	 build	 these	 railways,	 bridges	 and	 tunnels.	Concerns	 about	 environmental	 protection	 and	 fiscal	 constraints	 resulting	 from	 the	 need	 to	balance	 public	 budgets	 need	 to	 be	 factored	 in.4	 In	 practice,	 two	 distinct	 but	 interrelated	phenomena	can	be	observed.	First,	large	economic	actors	take	over	increasing	numbers	of	tasks	in	the	delivering	of	infrastructure	projects	over	a	long	period	of	time	(including	legal,	technical																																																														2	Hansard,	Commons	Debates,	17	January	2018,	vol.	634.		3	 Infrastructure	 and	 Projects	 Authority,	 National	 Infrastructure	 Delivery	 Plan	 2016-2021,	 2016,	 p.	 23.	Similar	pipelines	exist	in	France	and	Belgium.	République	française,	Le	Grand	plan	d'investissement,	2018-
2022,	2017;	Région	wallonne,	Plan	Infrastructures	2016-2019,	2016;	Vlaamse	Regering,	Beleidsnota	2014-
2019:	Mobiliteit	en	Openbare	Werken,	Vl.	Parl.,	(2014-2015),	St.	152/1).	The	European	Union	financially	supports	major	transport	infrastructure	projects	for	2016-2020,	with	direct	benefits	for	Belgium,	France	and	 the	 United	 Kingdom:	 https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/ten-t-guidelines/project-funding_en.			4	In	the	case	of	Belgium	and	France	this	results	from	the	Maastricht	criteria	set	up	to	organize	the	European	economic	and	monetary	Union	(Article	126(2)	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union;	Protocol	(nr	12)	on	the	excessive	deficit	procedure).	The	United	Kingdom	was	undecided	about	joining	this	system	for	a	long	time	and	now	seeks	to	keep	the	budget	balanced	for	political	reasons.		
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 3.	and	 financial	 advice	 to	 public	 bodies).	 Secondly,	 citizens	 voice	 their	 environmental,	 social	 or	personal	concerns	regarding	infrastructure	projects,	meaning	that	they	become	involved	in	their	overall	 design	 and	 implementation.	These	 two	phenomena	 result	 in	public	 authorities	 seeing	their	role	in	these	complex	projects	changing	dramatically	from	delivering	services	connected	to	public	infrastructures	to	initiating,	mediating,	steering	and	supervising	these	projects	with	little	in-house	expertise	to	do	so.		 	Economic,	political	and	legal	developments	have	also	a	major	consequence	for	public-private	co-operation:	the	time-frame	within	which	major	infrastructure	projects	are	designed,	delivered	and	maintained	has	been	extended	as	each	step	of	 the	process	requires	careful	consideration	and	engagement	 with	 multiple	 stakeholders,	 and	 is	 likely	 to	 face	 legal	 challenges	 and/or	 public	resistance.	Timing	is	also	crucial	as	political	decision-makers	may	be	prone	to	engage	in	major	infrastructure	projects	to	reap	electoral	benefits	in	the	hope	that	they	are	unlikely	to	be	the	ones	to	be	called	to	account	if	and	when	problems	arise	down	the	line.	Time	is	also	key	when	it	comes	to	 dealing	with	 issues	 arising	 from	 these	 infrastructure	 projects:	 any	 delays	 incurred	 by	 the	project	 because	of	 lingering	disputes	 and	 legal	 uncertainty	 are	 costly.	This	 calls	 therefore	 for	reassessing	 judges’	 role	 in	 policing	 infrastructure	 projects	 that	 affect	 the	 life	 quality	 of	 their	neighbours	and	users.		When	it	comes	to	specific	matters	encapsulating	these	evolutions	the	most	prominent	debates	in	the	legal	scholarship	most	often	relate	to	the	scope	of	competition	between	economic	actors,5	the	need	for	more	democratic	legitimacy	and	state-centred	intervention6	or	the	appropriate	level	of	regulation	(European	vs.	national).7	However,	this	paper	takes	a	different	starting	point,	namely	the	factual	situation	on	which	major	infrastructure	projects	are	predicated.	They	all	require	a	high	level	of	co-operation	between	public	and	private	actors	over	an	extended	duration	(often	more	than	twenty	years)	while	in	many	instances	encountering	strong	opposition	from	local	residents	(the	 NIMBY	 reaction),	 users	 and/or	 interest	 groups	 (e.g.	 environmental	 or	 professional	organizations).	This	paper	investigates	the	tension	arising	between	this	extensive	collaboration	(to	 pursue	 economic	 objectives)	 and	 these	 intense	 conflicts	 (with	 social	 and	 political	 forces	claiming	that	the	common	good	needs	to	be	more	inclusive).			This	tension	raises	the	question	of	what	role	judges	play	in	adjudicating	issues	arising	in	major	infrastructure	projects.	Hence	this	paper	contributes	to	the	discussions	about	new		developments	in	new	administrative	law.	This	is	based	on	a	micro-comparison	of	selected	case	studies	of	major	transport	infrastructures	at	the	interface	between	local,	national	and	European	law,	illustrating	the	changing	role	of	public	bodies,	private	parties	and	judges	in	Belgium,	England	and	France.	England	and	France	are	indeed	polar	opposites	when	it	comes	to	their	approaches	to	government	contracts	(the	legal	category	under	which	public	private	co-operations	fall),8	while	Belgium	is	an	interesting	mix	of	the	two.		This	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	Section	2	explains	the	changes	shaping	the	main	features	of	public-private	co-operation.	Sections	3,	4	and	5	then	illustrate	how	long-term	public-private	co-operation	 is	 currently	 organised	 with	 case	 studies	 drawn	 from	 transport	 infrastructures	 in,	respectively,	England,	France	and	Belgium.	These	sections	especially	focus	on	the	role	played	by																																																														5	A.	Sanchez-Graells,	Public	Procurement	and	the	EU	Competition	Rules	(2nd	edn,	Oxford	Bloomsbury	2015).		6	S.	Arrowsmith,	 ‘The	purpose	of	the	EU	procurement	directives:	Ends,	means,	and	the	implications	for	national	regulatory	space	for	commercial	and	horizontal	procurement	policies’,	14	Cambridge	Yearbook	of	
European	 Legal	 Studies	1	 (2011-12);	 P.	 Kunzlik,	 ‘Neoliberalism	 and	 the	 European	 public	 procurement	regime’,	15	Cambridge	Yearbook	of	European	Legal	Studies	283	(2012-13).		7	Arrowsmith,	above	(n	6).		8	A.	C.	L.	Davies,	The	public	law	of	government	contracts	(OUP	2008)	55-58.	
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 4.	judges	 in	 addressing	 the	 tensions	 arising	 from	 these	 infrastructure	projects.	 Section	6	brings	together	the	lessons	that	can	be	drawn	from	comparing	these	case	studies	to	suggest	how	judges	could	contribute	meaningfully	to	the	scrutiny	of	long-term	public-private	co-operation.	
II. New	dynamics	in	public-private	co-operation:	shifting	risks	back	and	forth			This	section	depicts	 the	historical	background	within	which	public-private	co-operation	takes	place	and	the	parallel	development	of	administrative	law.9	Whilst	public	and	private	actors	have	long	interacted	to	develop	major	transport	infrastructures,	the	legal	principles	regulating	these	relationships	 and	 the	 respective	 roles	 of	 parliaments,	 executives	 and	 judges	 have	 very	much	fluctuated.	 Public-private	 co-operation	 is	 indeed	 not	 new	 in	 its	 principle	 but	modalities	 are.	Administrative	 law	 is	 both	 shaping	 these	new	modalities	 and	 seeking	 to	 catch	up	with	 them.	Broadly	speaking	three	main	stages	can	be	distinguished,	building	on	each	other	as	layers	upon	layers.		In	 a	 first	 period	 of	 development	 of	 administrative	 law,	 i.e.	 during	 the	 economic	 liberalism	presiding	over	the	Industrial	Revolution,	individual	freedom	was	pivotal.	The	administration	was	supposed	to	be	an	expert	acting	as	an	agent	of	the	legislature	(in	a	representative	democracy).	Judges	 were	 there	 to	 prevent	 unlawful	 unilateral	 administrative	 decisions	 encroaching	 on	individual	freedoms	or	private	property.	At	the	time	economic	actors	shouldered	investment	in	infrastructure	such	as	railways.10	Yet,	this	fragmented	system	led	to	market	failures	as	risks	were	not	managed	well	 by	 private	 actors,	 leading	 to	 financial	 difficulties.	 By	 the	 late	 19th	 century	Belgium,	 England	 and	 France	 had	 regulated	 the	 development	 of	 these	 infrastructures11	 and	issued	 increasingly	detailed	regulations	 in	a	range	of	economic	sectors	(e.g.	 railways,	banking	etc.)	whilst	recognizing	some	of	the	social	demands	for	more	protection	of	workers	(e.g.	trade	unions,	freedom	of	association,	work	safety	regulation).	The	government’s	role	grew	as	specific	(public)	 bodies	 dealt	 with	 inspection,	 administrative	 authorizations,	 etc.12	 Despite	 different	models	of	administrative	justice	in	the	three	countries	lawyers	and	judges	overall	played	a	key	role	during	this	first	phase	of	development,	ensuring	that	the	administration	worked	according	to	the	legality	principle.13			The	birth	of	the	welfare	state	characterizes	the	second	period	of	administrative	law:	it	resulted	in	 a	 reorganization	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 government	 expanded	 to	 include	 organized	 interests	 in	administrative	decision-making	(e.g.	 consultation,	committees).	The	government,	departments	and	 public	 agencies	 undertook	 numerous	 new	 functions:	 they	 first	 became	 more	 active	 in	providing	 public	 goods	 and	 services	 that	 individuals	 could	 not	 provide	 individually	 for	themselves.	After	WWII	their	activities	expanded	again	and	led	to	the	social	welfare	state:	the																																																															9	For	an	extended	account	of	changes	in	administrative	law,	see	F.	Bignami,	‘From	expert	administration	to	accountability	 network:	 A	 new	 paradigm	 for	 comparative	 administrative	 law’,	 59	American	 Journal	 of	
Comparative	Law	859	(2011).			10	 E.g.	 in	 France:	 X.	 Bezançon,	2000	 ans	 d’histoire	 du	 partenariat	 public-privé	 (Paris,	 Presses	 de	 l’école	nationale	des	ponts	et	chaussées	2004)	183-229.			11	See	e.g.	P.	Errera,	Traité	de	droit	public	belge	(Paris,	Giard	et	Brières	1909)	624-30	(Belgium	is	one	of	the	earliest	continental	countries	to	have	developed	railways).		12	C.	Harlow	and	R.	Rawlings,	Law	and	Administration	(3rd	edn,	CUP	2009)	50-51.		13	 Even	 in	 England,	 despite	 the	 Diceyan	 myth.	 See:	 C.	 McCormick,	 ‘Standards	 of	 judicial	 review	 of	administrative	action	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	(1890-1910)’,	workshop	 ‘Fin	de	 siècle’	administrative	 law:	
Judicial	standards	for	public	authorities	-	1890-1910,	December	2017,	organized	by	G.	della	Cananea	(Rome),	on	file	with	the	authors.	
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 5.	government	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 promoting	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 well-being	 of	 citizens,	protecting	 them	 against	 vulnerable	 conditions	 of	 youth,	 old	 age,	 sickness,	 disability	 and	unemployment.14	 The	 administration’s	 decision-making,	 policy-making	 and	 public	 service	delivery	were	guided	by	detailed	laws,	regulations	and	administrative	procedures15	implemented	in	 a	 bureaucratic,	 hierarchical	 and	 centralised	 context.	 Major	 infrastructure	 projects	 were	included	in	this	approach.	As	public	bodies	were	directly	exercising	their	economic	powers	in	the	economy	(through	funding	and	contracts,	also	called	“dominium”)	attention	started	to	be	paid	to	ways	of	ensuring	the	political	accountability	of	this	kind	of	public	economic	activity.16		
	The	 third	 period	 of	 administrative	 law	 starts	 in	 the	 late	 sixties/early	 seventies	 when	 the	economic	circumstances	showed	the	limits	of	the	economic	policies	carried	out	after	WWII.	The	1973	oil	crisis	especially	required	Western	industrialized	states	to	adapt	their	previous	economic	policies	 to	 secure	 economic	 growth,	 coordinate	 investments	and	maintain	 overall	 social	well-being.	Keynesian	 ideas	were	no	 longer	 successful	 at	 addressing	 these	new	challenges.17	They	slowly	made	room	for	Hayek’s	ideas:	the	danger	of	state	intervention	in	the	economy	started	to	be	echoed	in	the	political	world.18	Indeed,	as	the	economic	circumstances	changed,	the	ideology	of	political	parties	also	changed.	For	example,	Margaret	Thatcher	initiated	reforms	regarding	the	size	of	the	government	in	the	UK.	Some	sectors	were	liberalized;	privatization	became	the	main	road	 to	 economic	 development;	 budgetary	 cuts	 in	 the	 public	 sector	 led	 to	 increasing	 private	investment	in	major	infrastructure	projects.		This	 new	 trend	 evolved	 into	 a	 broader	 concept	where	 government	 had	 to	 be	 “reinvented”.19	Citizens	became	customers,	and	theories	such	as	new	public	management	were	implemented	in	the	administration:	the	public	sector	was	reformed	based	on	approaches	drawn	from	the	private	sector;	audit	and	external	agencies	were	developed;	value	for	money	assessments	and	cost-benefit	analyses	 were	 undertaken	 to	 identify	 outsourcing	 options.	 Efficiency	 became	 paramount	 for	public	action.	 Involving	the	private	sector	extensively	 in	public	projects	became	necessary.	As	public	bodies	did	not	have	the	financial	means	to	invest	in	public	infrastructure	themselves	they	needed	to	rely	on	private	investments	to	secure	the	realization	of	public	projects.			Moreover,	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 European	 (Monetary)	 Union	 and	 associated	 budgetary	constraints	encouraged	public	bodies	to	look	for	new	organizational	forms	that	would	help	them	keep	their	deficit	under	control.20	This	reinforced	the	incentives	for	public	actors	to	involve	the	private	 sector	 in	 their	major	 infrastructure	projects	 and	especially	 in	 their	 financing.	 Yet,	 EU	procurement	directives	constrain	which	contractors	public	bodies	are	able	to	choose	as	award	procedures	and	selection	criteria	are	tightly	regulated.21																																																																14	Social	insurance	and	allied	services	[1942-43	Cmd.	6404]	(Beveridge	Report).		15	P.	Cane,	Controlling	administrative	power	–	An	historical	comparison	(CUP	2016)	39-46.			16	T.	Daintith,	‘Regulation	by	contract:	The	new	prerogative’,	32	Current	Legal	Problems	41	(1979).		17	M.	Mazower,	Dark	continent	–	Europe’s	twentieth	century	(London	Penguin	1998)	chapter	10.		18	The	road	to	serfdom	(London	Routledge	1944).		
19	D.	Osborne	and	T.	Gaebler,	Reinventing	government:	How	the	entrepreneurial	spirit	is	transforming	the	
public	sector	(Reading,	Addison-Wesley	1992).		20	G.	Pagano	et	al.,	‘Les	investissements	publics	à	l’épreuve	des	normes	européennes:	les	cas	du	tram	de	Liège,	de	CITEO	et	de	l’Oosterweel’,	(nr	2328)	Courrier	hebdomadaire	du	CRISP	5	(2017).		21	S.	Arrowsmith,	The	Law	of	Public	and	Utilities	Procurement	(3rd	edn,	Sweet	and	Maxwell	2014).	
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	These	changes	transformed	the	role	of	private	parties	(economic	actors	and	citizens)	in	major	infrastructure	projects.		They	gave	rise	to	innovative	investment	techniques	in	major	projects	in	the	1990s	with	the	Private	Finance	Initiatives	in	England,	“contrat	de	partenariat”	(partnering	contracts	or	public-private	partnerships)	in	France,	and	Design-Build-Finance-Manage	contracts	in	Belgium.22	Although	the	contractual	modalities	of	these	new	techniques	are	tailored	to	each	specific	 project	 they	 all	 rely	 on	 long-term	 contracts	 between	 public	 and	 private	 actors.	 They	illustrate	a	major	trend	in	administrative	law	and	practice	at	that	time:	the	idea	of	(more)	co-operation	between	public	and	private	partners,	of	creating	more	horizontal	relations,	of	sharing	tasks	 and	 risks,	 of	 equality	 between	 partners	 rather	 than	 unilateral	 action	 taken	 by	 public	partners.	Accounting	techniques	were	used	to	shift	the	risks	of	the	projects	off	the	public	balance	sheet.23	At	 the	 same	 time	European	 law	became	 increasingly	 influential	and	 strongly	affected	classic	national	 administrative	 law.	 For	 example,	 EU	procurement	directives	 limit	 how	public	contracts	 can	 be	 amended	 even	 though	 changing	 circumstances	 may	 call	 for	 adapting	 the	contract.24			A	range	of	consequences	ensue	for	public	bodies.	First,	their	role	is	changing	as	they	engage	in	these	public-private	co-operations.	Such	co-operation	requires	extensive	expertise	 in	financial	and	economic	engineering	to	set	up	the	complex	contractual	relationships	at	their	core.	However,	public	bodies	do	not	have	this	in-house	so	they	seek	external	expertise	to	advise	them	on	their	projects.	This	means	that	they	are	not	well	equipped	to	analyse	situations	independently	and	to	anticipate	or	respond	to	changing	circumstances	from	their	own	motion.	Secondly,	private	parties	and	their	 financial	backers	seek	 to	minimise	the	actual	risks	 that	they	are	 taking,	 leading	to	a	situation	where	contractual	terms	for	termination	or	financial	guarantees	are	designed	to	ensure	that	 major	 infrastructure	 projects	 are	 secure	 investments	 for	 private	 actors.	 Thirdly,	 major	infrastructure	projects	as	they	are	currently	developed	present	a	contradiction:	on	the	one	hand,	they	need	to	be	flexible	to	adapt	to	changing	circumstances;	on	the	other	hand,	their	contractual	rigidity	is	built	in	to	cater	for	any	possible	risk	to	which	the	project	could	be	exposed,	making	the	project	more	expansive	in	the	negotiation	stage	and	in	the	case	of	re-negotiation	or	termination.	Overall,	public	bodies	endorse	an	increasingly	supervisory	and	monitoring	role	while	not	having	the	suitable	skills,	resources	or	information	to	do	so.		The	political	consequences	of	choosing	long-term	public-private	co-operation	to	deliver	major	infrastructure	projects	can	arise	long	after	the	political	decision-makers	are	gone,	challenging	the	idea	that	these	projects	are	carried	out	with	full	political	accountability.	This	time	lag	between	contractual	design	and	supervening	problem	entails	that	the	very	people	who	are	at	the	source	of	the	contractual	design	have	moved	away,	cannot	be	called	to	account	and	do	not	learn	from	their	mistakes.	As	it	stands	the	law	does	not	provide	for	any	solution	to	this	problem,	feeding	into	the	distrust	that	citizens	may	have	towards	major	infrastructure	projects.	Resistance	from	users	and	the	public	at	large	follows	from	this.	The	benefits	of	these	projects	are	not	understood,	while	the	immediate	personal	drawbacks	(noise,	loss	of	home,	destruction	of	local	communities	and/or	protected	natural	areas	etc.)	are	all	too	clear,	as	is	the	apparently	reduced	role	of	public	bodies.																																																																22	For	a	detailed	analysis	and	comparison:	see	Y.	Marique,	‘An	English	legal	perspective	on	public-private	partnerships’,	95-165;	S.	Van	Garsse	and	S.	Wyckaert,	‘Les	partenariats	public-privé	en	Belgique’,	183-212;	F.	Lichère,	‘Les	partenariats	public-privé	en	droit	français’,	307-332,	in	Public-Private	Partnerships	–	Reports	
of	the	XVIIIth	Conference	of	the	Academy	of	Comparative	Law	(F.	Lichère	ed,	Brussels	Bruylant	2011).		23	NAO,	PFIs	and	PF2	(2017-19	HC	718)	para	1.14;	Eurostat,	A	Guide	to	the	Statistical	Treatment	of	PPPs,	2016.		24	E.g.:	Directive	2014/24/EU	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	26	February	2014	on	public	procurement.	
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 7.	Overall,	these	main	features	of	public-private	co-operation	are	present	in	Belgium,	France	and	England	 although	 their	 modalities	 vary,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 case	 studies	 below.	 New	administrative	structures	are	emerging	to	regulate	these	complex	relationships	between	public	bodies,	 economic	 actors	 and	 citizens.	 This	 shifting	 has	 led	 to	 changes	 in	 judges’	 roles	 as	 the	opportunities	for	them	to	intervene	have	evolved.	The	next	three	sections	analyse	these	changes	in	three	case	studies	where	these	tensions	between	co-operation	and	opposition	have	arisen.		
III. High	Speed	2	(England)		England	 is	 home	 to	 the	 most	 important	 transport	 infrastructure	 project	 currently	 being	developed	in	Europe	with	the	building	of	High	Speed	2	(HS2),	a	rail	project	linking	London	with	Northern	 England	 (Birmingham,	 Manchester	 and	 Leeds).	 This	 project	 is	 being	 developed	 in	stages,	with	completion	planned	for	2033	and	a	total	budget	of	ca.	£50	billion.25	Rail	tracks	need	to	cross	protected	areas	(e.g.	the	Chilterns)	and	a	range	of	properties	need	to	be	purchased.	Trains	should	run	at	250	miles/hour	(i.e.	400	km/hour).	This	project	has	three	main	objectives:	firstly,	encouraging	economic	balance	between	London	and	Northern	England;	secondly,	fostering	urban	regeneration	 around	 the	 new	 train	 stations;	 and	 thirdly,	 improving	 travel	 time	 to	 and	 from	London	for	commuters,	offering	a	more	comfortable	working	environment	in	the	new	trains.	This	section	 sets	 out	 how	 the	 public-private	 co-operation	 has	 been	 organized	 and	 how	 public	resistance	to	it	has	been	expressed.	
	To	develop	this	public-private	co-operation	the	Department	for	Transport	(DfT)	set	up	a	non-departmental	body,	HS2	Ltd.26	The	DfT	acts	as	the	sponsor	responsible	for	investment	decisions	and	gives	policy	directions	 to	HS2	 (e.g.	 deciding	on	 rail	works	 regulation;	 how	 the	 railway	 is	owned,	operated,	and	maintained;	interdependencies	with	other	transport	policies).	It	sponsors	the	HS2	bill	 in	Parliament	and	it	owns	and	funds	HS2	Ltd.	In	turn,	HS2	Ltd.	 is	in	charge	of	the	technical	 sides	 of	 the	 project,	 namely	 of	 designing	 routes	 (compliance	 with	 technical,	environmental	and	construction	standards),	of	carrying	out	environmental	impact	assessments	and	of	engaging	with	national	bodies,	local	authorities	and	local	communities.	The	actual	work	of	designing	 the	 systems	 and	 building	 the	 rail	 tracks,	 stations,	 bridges,	 tunnels	 and	 hangars	 is	carried	out	by	engineering	and	building	companies	selected	following	a	procurement	procedure.	In	July	2017	a	first	batch	of	four	contracts	for	£6.6	bn	were	awarded:	one	to	Skanska,	Costain	and	Strabag;	one	to	Bouygues,	VolkerFitzpatrick	and	Sir	Robert	McAlpine;	one	to	Balfour	Beatty	and	VINCI;	and	the	last	one	to	Kier,	Eiffage	and	Carillon.27		Developing	this	project	entails	complying	with	a	range	of	legal	requirements28	and	dealing	with	citizens’	 complaints	 arising	 from	 this	 public-private	 co-operation.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 crucial	requirements	 includes	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 hybrid	 bill	 by	 Parliament.29	 Following	 a	 specific	procedure	dating	back	to	the	19th	century30	a	hybrid	bill	grants	public	bodies	(here	the	DfT	and																																																															25	Economic	Affairs	Committee,	Economics	of	High	Speed	2	(2014-15	HL	134)	5.		26	NAO,	Progress	with	preparations	for	High	Speed	2	(2016	HC	235)	figure	4.		27	 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/first-big-hs2-contracts-to-build-britains-new-railway-will-support-16000-jobs	.		28	V.	Jenkins,	‘Planning	for	major	infrastructure	in	England:	Front-loading	participation	in	the	interests	of	efficiency’,	in	Quality	and	speed	in	administrative	decision-making:	Tension	or	balance?,	83	(C.	Backes	and	M.	Eliantonio	eds.,	Cambridge,	Intersentia,	2016).		29	The	High	Speed	Rail	(London	-	West	Midlands)	Act	2017	is	the	first	bill	adopted.	Further	bills	need	to	be	adopted	for	the	next	stages	of	the	project.		
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 8.	HS2	 Ltd)	 the	 necessary	 powers	 to	 buy	 the	 property	 where	 the	 tracks	 are	 being	 laid	 and	 to	undertake	 all	 necessary	 steps	 for	 allowing	 contractors	 to	 carry	 out	 works.31	 The	 procedure	follows	 the	 elaboration	 of	 an	 ordinary	 bill,	 including	 readings,	 committee,	 plenary	 vote	 and	adoption	in	the	two	Chambers.	However,	a	step	is	added	in	the	House	of	Commons	and	the	House	of	Lords:32	individuals	who	have	an	interest	are	entitled	to	lodge	a	petition	to	make	their	interests	known	and	to	be	heard	by	a	dedicated	commission	whose	objective	is	to	find	a	solution	for	the	petitioners.33	In	the	case	of	the	HS2	2,600	petitions	have	been	lodged	in	the	House	of	Commons	and	ca.	300	in	the	House	of	Lords.	In	many	cases	the	developer	has	come	forward	with	settlement	proposals	and	the	commission	has	not	actually	had	to	recommend	a	solution.	
	In	 this	way	 the	 hybrid	 bill	 allows	 for	 individual	 claims	 to	 be	 addressed	without	 any	 judicial	intervention.	Yet,	HS2	has	been	developed	in	a	controversial	context	filled	with	legal,	economic	and	political	issues34	such	as	the	application	of	European	requirements	relating	to	environmental	impact	assessments,	the	need	to	compensate	residents	for	the	loss	of	their	property	and	the	need	to	audit	how	public	money	is	spent.			Furthermore,	major	infrastructure	projects	such	as	HS2	are	not	a	one-shot	purchasing	operation	by	public	bodies.	At	the	core	of	the	public-private	co-operation	lies	the	development	of	a	public	infrastructure	with	wide	socio-economic	and	political	implications	not	only	at	one	single	moment	in	 time	but	 for	 the	next	 twenty	years	 if	not	 longer.	The	private	contractors	have	an	extensive	operational	role.	This	makes	public-private	co-operation	distinctive	 in	 terms	of	public	bodies’	needs	to	manage	changes	and	crises.	Issues	arising	of	the	public-private	co-operation	and	their	creative	problem-solving	can	be	illustrated	with	formal	and	informal	techniques.			Firstly,	an	“independent	HS2	construction	commissioner”	was	set	up	to	sort	out	issues	arising	between	the	different	actors	and	with	the	communities	affected	by	the	construction.	Secondly,	the	spending	of	taxpayers’	money	is	tightly	controlled	by	the	National	Audit	Office	(NAO).	For	instance,	the	NAO	refused	to	certify	HS2	Ltd.’s	accounts	for	2016-17:	a	departure	from	the	regular	rules	for	redundancy	asked	for	by	HS2	Ltd	had	been	refused	by	the	DfT	but	this	was	not	complied	with	by	HS2	Ltd.,	resulting	in	generous	redundancy	payments.35	This	prompted	the	DfT	to	ask	for	a	governmental	audit,	which	it	published	and	shared	with	the	public	accounts	committee	(PAC).36	More	systematically,	the	NAO	also	questioned	the	economic	assessment	of	the	project.37	This	was	then	 followed	up	by	 	PAC	discussions	and	reports.38	The	House	of	Lords	also	reported	on	 the																																																														30	R.	Perceval,	The	origin	and	essence	of	hybrid	bill,	2(1)	Parliamentary	Affairs,	139,	142-43	(1949).		31	High	Speed	Rail	(London	-	West	Midlands)	Act	2017	sections	1	and	4	especially.		32	 House	 of	 Commons	 Library,	Hybrid	 Bills:	 House	 of	 Commons	 Background	 Paper,	 SN/PC/6736,	 2013,	available	at	http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06736.			33	 See	 Petition	Kit,	House	 of	Lords:	 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/Lords-HS2/House-of-Lords-HS2-petitioning-kit-guide.pdf.		34	Select	Committee	on	the	High	Speed	Rail	(London	–	West	Midlands)	Bill,	High	Speed	Rail	(London	–	West	
Midlands)	Bill	(83	HL	2016–17)	4.		35	NAO,	Report	of	the	Comptroller	and	Auditor	General	on	the	2016-17	Accounts	of	High	Speed	Two	(HS2)	
Limited;	PAC,	High	Speed	2	Annual	Report	and	Accounts	(2017-19	HC	454).		36	DfT,	High	Speed	2	Limited	–	Annual	Report	and	Accounts,	25th	October	2017.			37	NAO,	High	Speed	2	–	A	review	of	early	programme	preparation	(2013	HC	124);	Progress	with	preparations	
for	High	Speed	2	(2016	HC	235).		
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 9.	economic	 case	of	 the	HS2.39	These	 reports	 flagged	up	 a	 range	of	 issues,	 such	 as	 the	delays	 in	adopting	the	hybrid	bill,40	the	uncertainty	regarding	the	route	to	be	adopted	for	part	of	the	project	and	the	uncertain	public	or	private	funding	for	trains	and	hangars.41			Finally,	problems	arising	from	changing	circumstances	are	illustrated	in	HS2	with	the	Carillon	crisis.	Carillon,	one	of	the	contractors	selected	in	HS2,	went	into	administration	in	January	2018,	six	months	after	being	selected.	Political	questions	arise	concerning	identifying	how	the	DfT	had	chosen	a	contractor	in	financial	difficulties	although	it	performed	numerous	public	contracts	in	England.	Prime	Minister	May	acknowledged	this	when	she	said:			 “If	the	Government	pulled	out	of	contracts,	[…]		whenever	a	profit	warning	was	issued,	that	would	be	the	best	way	to	ensure	that	companies	failed	and	jobs	were	lost.	It	would	also	raise	real	issues	for	 the	 Government	 about	 providing	 continuing,	 uninterrupted	 public	 services.	 Yes,	 we	 did	recognise	 that	 it	 was	 a	 severe	 profit	 warning,	 which	 is	 why	we	 took	 action	 in	 relation	 to	 the	contracts	that	we	issued.	We	ensured	that	all	but	one	of	those	contracts	was	a	joint	venture.	What	does	that	mean?	It	means	that	another	company	is	available	to	step	in	and	take	over	the	contract.”42			This	pragmatic	answer	triggers	a	range	of	legal	questions.	For	instance,	under	procurement	law	a	change	of	contractor	is	subject	to	conditions.43	Even	in	the	case	of	insolvency	no	substantial	changes	to	a	contract	should	be	carried	out	when	a	new	contractor	replaces	an	insolvent	one.	Furthermore,	Carillon	seems	to	have	developed	a	business	practice	of	making	low	bids	to	win	contracts	so	that	it	could	pay	its	mounting	debts	with	the	new	money.44	If	this	were	confirmed	questions	might	be	raised	about	the	financial	conditions	of	the	HS2	contract	awarded	to	Carillon,	in	 joint	venture	with	Kier	and	Eiffage,	and	the	government’s	awareness	of	 the	overall	 scheme	might	come	under	scrutiny.	Although	private	contractors	are	contractually	supposed	to	bear	wide	risks	the	actual	bearer	of	risks	in	the	last	resort	when	financial	trouble	arises	is	the	public	purse.	A	parliamentary	 inquiry	has	been	 immediately	 called.45	 Political	accountability	 of	 this	 kind	 is	triggered	once	a	problem	has	arisen	however.	It	does	not	prevent	legal,	financial	or	political	risks.	In	 light	of	 the	high	 financial	 risks	 in	major	 infrastructure	projects	public-private	co-operation	needs	to	be	on	a	stronger	footing:	social	learning	from	both	the	co-operation	itself	and	lessons	to	be	drawn	from	similar	projects	might	be	the	way	forward.46	
 																																																													38	 PAC,	 High	 Speed	 2	 –	 A	 review	 of	 early	 programme	 preparation	 (2013-14	 HC	 478);	 Progress	 with	
preparations	for	High	Speed	2	(2016-17	HC	486).			39	Economic	Affairs	Committee,	Economics	of	High	Speed	2	(2014-15	HL	134).		40	NAO,	Progress	with	preparations	for	High	Speed	2	(2016	HC	235)	6.		41	Ibid.	28;	PAC,	Progress	with	the	preparation	for	High	Speed	2	(2016-17	HC	486).		42	 https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-01-17/debates/0A490445-C4BD-46CE-8E33-DFD9B6AA5872/Engagements	.	
43	Article	72	(1)	(d)	(ii)	Directive	2014/24/EU	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	26	February	2014	on	public	procurement	and	repealing	Directive	2004/18/EC.	
44	 J.	Coley,	 ‘Carillion	Q&A:	The	consequences	of	 collapse	and	what	 the	government	should	do	next’,	The	
Conversation,	20	January	2018.		45	Public	administration	and	constitutional	affairs	committee,	Sourcing	public	services:	lessons	learned	from	
the	collapse	of	Carillion	inquiry,	15	January	2018.		 	46	On	the	principle	of	“social	learning”:	see	T.	Prosser	and	L.	Butler,	‘Rail	Franchises,	Competition	and	Public	Service’,	81(1)	Modern	Law	Review	23–50,	36	(2018).		
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 10.	Overall,	 the	 public-private	 co-operation	 in	 HS2	 has	 led	 to	 problems	 between	 the	 public	 and	private	 partners	 that	 are	 addressed	 pragmatically	 by	 formal	 and	 informal	 bodies	 or	 ad	 hoc	techniques.	 Judges	 have	 not	 been	 involved	 so	 far.	 Based	 on	previous	 experiences	 in	 England	judges	 would	 probably	 only	 be	 asked	 to	 adjudicate	 on	 matters	 in	 extreme	 circumstances.47	However,	 the	 situation	 differs	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 HS2’s	 external	 governance,	 where	 citizens’	opposition	has	found	a	range	of	more	or	less	successful	routes,	partly	hinging	on	judges	to	give	them	some	leverage.	These	techniques	are	briefly	summed	up	here	starting	with	a	more	informal	procedure.		Firstly,	public	resistance	from	individuals/residents’	groups	along	the	HS2	route	was	expressed	to	the	parliamentary	ombudsman.	In	this	case	a	small	village	had	half	of	its	residents	expelled	whilst	the	other	half	were	provided	with	compensatory	measures.	However,	the	procedure	led	to	such	 a	 breakdown	 in	 communication	 between	 HS2	 Ltd.	 and	 the	 residents	 that	 residents	complained	to	the	ombudsman.	In	her	report	the	ombudsman	decided	that	HS2	Ltd.	had	breached	principles	 of	 good	 behaviour	 and	 recommended	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 a	 “HS2	 resident	commissioner”48	 to	 act	as	an	 interface	between	HS2	Ltd.	 and	 local	 residents.49	 Since	 then	 the	commissioner	has	issued	regular	updates	about	the	project	and	HS2	Ltd.	responds	to	the	issues	the	commissioner	flags	up.	For	instance,	social	media	is	now	used	to	disseminate	information	to	residents	 about	 compensation	 plans	 available	 to	 them.50	 Here	 an	 informal	 procedure	 set	 in	motion	new	ways	to	reach	out	to	residents	and	address	their	questions,	hence	to	contain	their	opposition	and	prevent	delays	in	building	the	project.		Secondly,	several	freedom	of	information	(FOI)	requests	were	lodged	according	to	the	Freedom	of	Information	Act	2000.	In	one	of	these,	in	2011,	a	claimant	asked	for	the	disclosure	of	a	project	management	review	report	drafted	by	the	then	Major	Project	Authority,	a	unit	inside	the	Cabinet	Office.	During	the	course	of	this	request	the	DfT	decided	to	use	a	ministerial	veto	to	override	the	Information	Commissioner’s	decision	to	allow	the	disclosure	of	the	document.51	Such	a	veto	is	only	rarely	used.	The	Supreme	Court	limited	the	scope	of	the	ministerial	veto	in	a	similar	case,	however,52	leading	the	successor	of	the	Major	Project	Authority,	the	Infrastructure	and	Project																																																															47	Such	as	in	the	London	Underground	PPPs,	when	financial	distress	led	a	PPP	into	administration:	third	parties	(creditors	or	users)	need	to	be	protected	and	judges	are	called	upon.	Procurement	is	still	on-going	in	 HS2	 (e.g.:	 Ted	 notice	 published	 in	 April	 2017,	 available	 here:	http://ted.europa.eu/TED/notice/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:151144-2017:TEXT:EN:HTML,	 invitations	 to	tender	expected	by		April	2018),	so	it	remains	to	be	seen	if	it	will	be	challenged.			48	Parliamentary	and	Health	Service	Ombudsman,	Report	of	the	results	of	an	investigation	into	a	complaint	
about	High	Speed	2	Ltd	(HS2	Ltd)	2015.		49	HS2	Residents’	Charter,	available	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hs2-residents-charter.		50	HS2	Residents’	Commissioner,	Report	5,	September	2016.		51	O.	Gay	and	E.	Potton,	FoI	and	ministerial	vetoes	(House	of	Commons	Library,	SN/PC/05007,	2014)	15.	DfT,	Exercise	of	the	Executive	override	under	section	53	of	the	Freedom	of	Information	Act	2000	in	respect	of	
a	 decision	 notice	 of	 the	 Information	 Commissioner	 dated	 6	 June	 2013	 (REF:	 FER0467548)	(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/276159/mpa-statement-of-reasons.pdf).		52	R	(Evans)	v	Attorney	General	[2015]	UKSC	21	[2015]	2	WLR	813.	This	case	involving	the	disclosure	of	mail	exchanges	with	the	Prince	of	Wales	is	not	factually	connected	to	the	HS2	but	the	Supreme	Court	limited	the	same	ministerial	veto	that	was	used	in	HS2.	This	ministerial	veto	could	be	used	so	that	the	Attorney	General	or	a	Cabinet	Minister	could	override	a	decision	(even	a	judicial	decision)	to	publish	administrative	documents.	The	Supreme	Court	decided	that	judicial	control	could	not	be	set	aside	by	the	executive	in	that	way.	Subsequently	to	the	Evans	decision	the	judicial	review	pertaining	to	HS2	was	conceded.	J.	Milford,	
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 11.	Authority	 (IPA),	 a	 body	 reporting	 to	 HM	 Treasury	 and	 the	 Cabinet	 Office,	 to	 release	 reports	pertaining	to	the	HS2.53	In	this	way	judges	ensure	that	new	techniques,	such	as	FOI,	are	made	effective	and	equip	citizens	and	associations	with	the	means	to	better	protect	their	rights	when	dealing	with	public	bodies	and	economic	actors. 	Thirdly,	 environmental	 associations	 opposing	 HS2	 argued	 that	 the	 European	 directive	 on	strategic	 environmental	 assessment54	 required	 an	 environmental	 impact	 assessment	 to	 be	carried	out.	The	government,	however,	considered	that	this	was	not	required	at	the	Command	Paper	stage	of	HS2	as	the	hybrid	bill	procedure	guaranteed	enough	public	participation	in	the	overall	process.	The	claimants	asked	the	Supreme	Court	to	refer	the	matter	to	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union.	The	Supreme	Court	declined	to	do	so,	considering	that	the	CJEU’s	previous	case	law	granted	domestic	courts	the	power	to	assess	for	themselves	whether	the	legislature	had	appropriate	information	to	assess	the	impact	of	the	project	on	the	environment.55	Therefore,	the	Supreme	Court	refrained	from	interfering	with	the	parliamentary	process56	as	it	does	not	belong	to	the	judiciary	to	review	this	cornerstone	of	the	political	process	in	a	democracy.57		Overall,	 the	HS2	helps	us	 to	 identify	 the	distinctive	contribution	of	 judges	 in	addressing	 legal	issues	arising	from	major	infrastructure	projects	in	England.	Among	the	wide	range	of	techniques	used	to	control	how	public	power	is	exercised,	taxpayers’	money	is	spent	and	private	property	affected,	Parliament	 features	prominently,	with	 the	hybrid	bill,	 the	PAC,	 the	 reports	 from	 the	ombudsman,	 and	 the	 coordination	 between	 the	 NAO	 and	 the	 DfT.	 In	 addition,	 minor	 bodies	(resident	commissioner,	construction	commissioner)	micro-manage	disputes	at	the	local	level.	In	this	picture	judges	only	have	an	interstitial	role.		Albeit	scarce,	judicial	decisions	significantly	frame	the	formal	space	within	which	HS2	is	decided	on	and	delivered.	The	Supreme	Court	has	agreed	to	defer	to	the	legislature	where	environmental	associations	can	make	their	position	known	and	provide	MPs	with	appropriate	information	to	help	them	decide	on	the	project.	Yet,	it	seeks	to	open	up	the	executive	significantly	more,	and	to	limit	 cases	when	 the	 government	 can	veto	 the	disclosure	of	 administrative	documents	 in	 the	name	of	public	interest.	Strategically	used	in	relation	to	HS2	FOI	helps	to	peel	away	some	aspects	of	the	project	so	as	to	bring	more	administrative	documents	into	the	public	debate.	This	means	that	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 seeks	 to	 define	 the	 judiciary’s	 role	 in	 relation	 to	 public-private	 co-operation	 in	 line	 with	 its	 overall	 understanding	 of	 power	 allocation	 in	 England,	 where	parliamentary	sovereignty58	and	political	accountability	when	it	comes	to	resource	allocation59																																																														
High	Speed	Trains	and	Black	Spider	Letters:	Freedom	of	Information	and	the	ministerial	veto,	20(4)	Judicial	Review	206,	214	(2015).		53	See:	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hs2-major-projects-authority-project-assessment-review-reports.		
	54	Directive	2001/42/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	27	June	2001	on	the	assessment	of	the	effects	of	certain	plans	and	programmes	on	the	environment.		55	R	on	the	application	of	HS2	Action	Alliance	Limited	v.	The	Secretary	of	State	for	Transport,	[2014]	UKSC	3	at	[88].		56	M.	Elliott,	‘Case	comment:	Constitutional	legislation,	European	Union	law	and	the	nature	of	the	United	Kingdom's	contemporary	Constitution’,	10(3)	European	Constitutional	Law	Review	379	(2014).		57	As	per	R	on	the	application	of	HS2	Action	Alliance	Limited	v.	The	Secretary	of	State	for	Transport,	[2014]	UKSC	3	at	[210]-[211].		58	Cfr.	R	(on	the	application	of	Miller	and	another)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European	Union	[2017]	UKSC	5.		
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 12.	are	key.	The	Supreme	Court	understands	its	role	as	the	great	clock-maker,	ensuring	that	all	the	flows	of	information	are	working	properly	in	the	constitutional	and	administrative	machinery	from	the	administration	to	Parliament	and	vice-versa,	and	from	civil	society	to	public	actors	and	vice-versa.	Yet,	it	does	not	make	any	substantive	or	political	judgements:	it	only	seeks	to	ensure	that	the	people	in	a	position	to	make	these	political	decisions	are	as	well	informed	as	possible	and	that	civil	society	is	not	unduly	obstructed	from	fulfilling	its	role.	Although	marginally	involved,	judges	have	made	far-reaching	contributions	to	the	debates	underlying	the	HS2	project.	Is	this	also	the	case	in	French	transport	infrastructure	projects?		
IV. Ecomouv’	(France)		The	challenges	encountered	by	French	classic	administrative	law	are	illustrated	with	a	case	study	where	popular	discontent	about	major	infrastructure	projects	has	not	been	properly	addressed.	The	Ecomouv’	project	epitomizes	the	current	tension	between	representative	and	participatory	democracy	in	France.	It	superposes	two	different	logics:	one	logic	in	which	the	French	Parliament	adopted	an	ecotax	with	near	unanimity	in	2009;	another	logic	where	street	opposition	organized	by	farmers	led	to	the	project’s	cancellation.60	This	case	study	helps	us	to	better	understand	the	challenges	that	French	administrative	judge	faces	in	retaining	and/or	redefining	their	traditional	role	 of	 shaping	 long-term	 contractual	 relationships	 between	 public	 and	 private	 actors.	 This	section	 maps	 these	 challenges	 within	 the	 public	 scrutiny	 exercised	 over	 French	 major	infrastructure	projects.			Since	the	1970s	France	has	periodically	faced	a	range	of	budgetary	crises.	In	the	1980s	it	first	decided	 to	nationalize	 key	 parts	 of	 its	 economic	 and	 financial	 sector	 before	 privatizing	 large	segments	 of	 its	 economy.	 In	 the	 2000s	 innovative	 techniques	 aiming	 to	 reform	 French	administration	 were	 adopted	 to	 address	 chronic	 indebtedness,	 including	 the	 introduction	 of	public-private	 co-operation	 under	 the	 form	 of	 “partnering	 contracts”.61	 In	parallel	with	 these	reforms	 the	 EU	 directive	 1999/6262	 on	 the	 “Eurovignette”	 was	 implemented.	 France	 then	adopted	 statutes	 organizing	 an	 ecotax	 and	 implementing	 the	 “polluter	 pays	 principle”.63	Supported	 by	 both	 the	 right	 and	 left-wing	 parties	 in	 Parliament,	 this	 ecological	 tax	 was	 not	supposed	to	be	levied	by	the	tax	administration	but	by	a	sophisticated	system	involving	a	private	partner	through	a	partnering	contract.			Public	and	private	interests	converged	in	this	project	at	different	levels.	First,	it	was	hoped	that	this	project,	operated	 from	Metz,	would	boost	economic	development	 in	a	region	badly	hit	by	economic	recession.	Secondly,	economic	actors	would	develop	the	infrastructure	required	to	levy	this	ecotax	(portals	across	France,	satellites	and	communication	systems	etc.),	levy	the	tax	from																																																														59	Lutton	(BC)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Education	[2011]	EWHC	217	(Admin)	[48].	For	a	critique	regarding	such	a	 restrictive	conception	of	 judges’	 constitutional	 role,	 see	E	Palmer,	 ‘Resources	allocation,	welfare	rights	–	Mapping	the	boundaries	of	judicial	control	in	public	administrative	law’,	20	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	
Studies	63,	74	(2000).		60	L.	Schmid,	‘L’exécutif	et	l’environnement:	une	spirale	de	renoncements’,	11	Esprit,	5	(2014).		61	Ordonnance	nr	2004-559,	17	June	2004	sur	les	contrats	de	partenariat,	later	modified	by	Loi	nr	2008-735,	 28	 July	 2008.	 This	 framework	 included	 various	 conditions	 for	 public-private	 contracts	 to	 be	concluded,	such	as	a	preliminary	assessment,	the	urgency	of	the	project,	its	complexity	and	a	cost/benefit	analysis.	A	competitive	dialogue	procedure	was	needed	to	award	them.			62	Directive	1999/62/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	17	June	1999	on	the	charging	of	heavy	goods	vehicles	for	the	use	of	certain	infrastructures.		63	Art.	11	Loi	nr	2009-967,	3	August	2009	relative	à	la	mise	en	œuvre	du	Grenelle	de	l'environnement;	art.	153	Loi	nr	2008-1425,	27	December	2008	de	finances	pour	2009	(as	amended	thereafter).	
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 13.	lorries	(though	invoicing	or	subscription)	and	then	pay	the	proceeds	to	the	state.	This,	however,	triggered	 legal	 questions	 under	 French	 law	 regarding	 the	 transfer	 of	 taxation,	 a	 sovereign	mission,	to	private	actors.	In	principle	a	partnering	contract	cannot	delegate	sovereign	missions	to	private	actors.64	Therefore	a	system	reminiscent	of	how	taxation	was	administered	in	France	prior	to	the	French	Revolution65	was	engineered	so	that	the	private	contractor	would	guarantee	all	the	proceeds	to	which	the	state	was	entitled,	and	the	French	tax	administration	would	be	solely	responsible	for	any	coercion	of	debtors	or	any	measure	requiring	the	use	of	force.	This	system	also	triggered	criticisms	as	it	meant	that	the	public	sector	would	lose	skills	and	expertise	and	become	more	reliant	on	economic	actors	to	fulfil	its	missions	(running	complex	infrastructures,	drafting	and	advising	on	complex	contractual	matters).66	Boundaries	between	public	and	private	actors	were	clearly	shifting.		Following	a	tendering	process	the	French	government	selected	Ecomouv’,	a	consortium	of	Italian	and	French	firms,	as	the	private	contractor	in	2011.	It	signed	a	contract	for	13	years	and	3	months,	under	which	the	tax	was	supposed	to	amount	ca.	1.2bn	EUR	each	year	and	200m	EUR	was	paid	to	Ecomouv’	 for	 its	services	(app.	20	%	of	 the	 tax	proceeds).	However,	 this	contract	met	with	strong	resistance	from	both	competitors	and	road	users.		First,	disappointed	bidders	challenged	the	contract.	They	argued	that	the	state	had	been	advised	by	a	daughter	company	of	Ecomouv’,	which	was	thus	involved	in	a	conflict	of	interests.	In	the	first	instance	 the	 administrative	 tribunal	 terminated	 the	 contract	 for	 breaching	 transparency	 and	competition	requirements.67	However,	the	Conseil	d’Etat68	maintained	it	as	the	collaboration	with	the	advisor	had	only	been	occasional	and	special	care	had	been	taken	during	the	procedure	to	avoid	the	decision-making	process	being	unduly	biased.	This	case	was	important	in	two	respects.	First,	 the	Conseil	 d’Etat	 applied	 for	 the	 first	 time	a	 general	 principle	 of	 impartiality	 in	public	contracts.	 Secondly,	 the	 type	of	 impartiality	 that	was	questioned	 related	 to	 an	 appearance	of	partiality	 flowing	 from	 relationships	 between	 corporations.	 It	was	 not	 a	 case	 of	 personal	 or	subjective	partiality	manifested	by	an	individual	involved	in	the	procedure.	The	administrative	judge	in	this	case	declined	to	quash	the	decision	for	breaching	the	impartiality	principle	on	the	basis	of	circumstantial	elements.	This	balancing	between	principle	and	modalities69	thus	offers	a	new	tool	for	an	administrative	judge	to	assess	the	awarding	of	public	contracts	with	due	respect	to	the	particular	facts	of	the	case,	while	offering	the	possibility	of	fostering	a	stronger	ethic	in	the	public	and	private	actors	involved	in	public	contracts.70				
																																																														64	C.C.,	nr	2003-473	DC,	26	June	2003,	relative	à	la	loi	habilitant	le	Gouvernement	à	simplifier	le	droit.			65	Sén.,	Rapport	fait	au	nom	de	la	commission	d’enquête	sur	les	modalités	du	montage	juridique	et	financier	
et	l’environnement	du	contrat	retenu	in	fine	pour	la	mise	en	oeuvre	de	l’écotaxe	poids	lourds,	(2013-14)	t.1,	27-28	(thereafter:	Senate	Report).		66	F.	Rollin,	‘Le	contrat	de	partenariat	“écotaxe”,	symptôme	d’un	Etat	impotent’,	Actualité	juridique	–	Droit	
Administratif	2225	(2013).		67	Trib	adm	(ord)	Cergy-Pontoise,	8	March	2011,	Actualité	juridique	–	Collectivités	territoriales	297	(2011).		68	C.É.fr.,	24	June	2011,	Ministre	de	 l'Écologie,	du	Développement	durable,	des	Transports	et	du	Logement,	
Droit	administratif	nr	84,	note	J.-B.	Auby	(2011).		69	A.	Friboulet,	‘Les	contours	du	principe	d’impartialité	appliqué	au	controle	de	la	régularité	de	la	procédure	de	passation	d’un	contrat	public’,	Revue	juridique	de	l’économie	publique,	comm.	54	(2011).		70	J.	B.	Auby,	‘Ecotaxe,	impartialité	de	l’administration,	conseils’,	Droit	administratif,	nr	84,	5-7	(2011).	
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 14.	Secondly,	 the	 contract	 met	 with	 public	 opposition	 coming	 from	 Britany	 farmers	 relying	 on	historic	rights	to	use	their	roads	free	of	charge,	rights	dating	back	to	a	previous	revolt	won	in	1675	against	royal	stamp	duties.	In	2013	these	farmers	destroyed	numerous	signal	transmitters	and	checkpoints.	As	a	consequence	the	Prime	Minister	first	suspended	the	introduction	of	the	tax,	then	called	it	off	at	the	end	of	the	year.	He	terminated	the	contract	and	a	transaction71	was	signed	with	Ecomouv’	to	compensate	it	for	the	cancellation	of	the	contract.72			This	solution	is	striking	for	technical	and	symbolic	reasons.	A	statute	voted	through	by	Parliament	(with	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 main	 political	 parties)	 had	 its	 implementation	 suspended	 by	 the	executive	leading	to	its	freezing	and	eventual	abrogation.73	Hence,	the	general	will	of	the	French	citizens	expressed	through	its	legitimate	and	constitutional	institutional	voice,	Parliament,	was	set	aside	by	the	regional	will	of	a	sectoral	group	acting	violently	on	the	streets.	The	executive	ratified	the	latter	against	the	explicit	will	of	the	former.	Judges	were	not	involved	in	any	way	in	clarifying	legal	matters	pertaining	to	the	political	choices	involved	in	this	case.	No	judicial	redress	was	relied	on.	Moreover,	judges	were	even	excluded	from	adjudicating	on	the	cancellation	of	the	contract	as	the	parties	agreed	to	settle,	although	settlements	in	French	public	contracts	remain	a	controversial	 matter.	 For	 instance,	 this	 suspicion	 was	 illustrated	 in	 Ms	 Lagarde’s	 case:	settlements	preclude	public	scrutiny	on	the	agreed	terms.74			
Ecomouv’	illustrates	the	limited	extent	to	which	scrutiny	can	be	maintained	over	public-private	co-operation	in	France.	It	is	true	that	a	range	of	public	bodies,	such	as	the	Cour	des	Comptes,	the	
Sénat	and	the	Assemblée	nationale75	(respectively	the	Audit	Court,	the	Higher	Chamber	and	the	Lower	Chamber),	have	issued	reports	on	this	case.	However,	little	detailed	information	from	the	
Cour	des	Comptes	is	available.	The	Senate’s	commission	did	not	benefit	from	the	input	of	French	expert76	institutions	able	to	advise	it	on	public-private	contracts.	The	Assemblée	nationale	heard	stakeholders	 and	 civil	 servants,	 with	 no	 hearing	 from	 the	 Cour	 des	 Comptes	 or	 a	 similar	independent	expert	body	able	 to	undertake	detailed	analysis	of	the	contractual	relationship.77	
																																																														71	Circulaire	6	April	2011	relative	au	développement	du	recours	à	la	transaction	pour	régler	amiablement	les	
conflits,	JORF	n°0083,	8	April	2011,	6248;	C.É.fr.,	Étude	annuelle	2015	du	Conseil	d'Etat	-	L'action	économique	
des	personnes	publiques	(Paris,	La	documentation	française,	2015)	147.		72	 Although	 the	 circumstances	 surrounding	 Ecomouv’	 may	 sound	 extreme	 the	 cancellation	 of	 major	infrastructure	projects	following	strong	opposition	 is	not	exceptional	 in	France.	For	 instance,	 the	high-speed	line	between	Poitiers-Limoges	was	cancelled	in	2016	(C.É.fr,	15	April	2016,	Fédération	nationale	des	
associations	 des	 usagers	 des	 transports).	 The	 construction	 of	 an	 airport	 in	 Notre-Dame-des-Landes	 is	equally	fiercely	contentious	(Mission	de	médiation	relative	au	projet	d’aéroport	du	Grand	Ouest,	Rapport,	2017,	available	at:	https://mediation-aeroport-du-grand-ouest.fr/).			73	Senate	Report	95-96	explains	how	a	legislative	provision	can	be	left	without	concrete	implementation	by	 the	Executive	 as	 long	 as	 the	Executive	 does	 not	 take	 the	 implementing	 decision	 and	 the	 legislative	provision	is	thereafter	abrogated.	In	the	case	of	the	ecotax,	the	executive	left	the	situation	“frozen”	until	the	Parliament	 eventually	 abrogated	 it	 (by	 article	 84	 loi	 de	 finances	 pour	 2017,	 upon	 an	 amendment	introduced	by	M.	Ferrand	et	al.,	n°	II-808,	13	Novembre	2016).			74	 O.	 Béaud,	 ‘La	 condamnation	 de	 Christine	 Lagarde	 par	 la	 Cour	 de	 justice’,	 Jus	 Politicum	(http://blog.juspoliticum.com/2016/12/20/la-condamnation-de-christine-lagarde-par-la-cour-de-justice-i/).		75	A.N.,	Rapport	d’information	déposé	par	la	mission	d’information	sur	l’écotaxe	poids	lourds,	14	May	2014,	nr	1937	(thereafter:	Assemblée	report).		76		It	held	hearings	of	a	law	academic	and	of	an	economics	academic,	experts	in	PPPs,	however.		
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 15.	The	 Senate’s	 commission	 also	 went	 to	 Brussels,	 Vienna	 and	 Bratislava	 to	 gain	 further	information.78	No	French	public	body	seems	to	have	been	able	to	assist	official	institutions	tasked	with	 public	 scrutiny	 of	 this	 public-private	 co-operation.	 Amidst	 this	 dearth	 of	 expertise	 the	administrative	 judge	 adjudicated	 on	 limited	 questions	 arising	 from	 this	 contract.	 The	 most	prominent	 legal	 question	 related	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 “impartiality”,	 an	 issue	 arising	 between	competing	economic	actors.	The	popular	opposition	did	not	find	any	judicial	channels	through	which	to	express	itself.79		Overall,	this	case	illustrates	how	“force	trumps	legality”.	The	opponents’	force	won	thanks	to	the	forum	offered	by	 the	media.	The	executive	checkmated	 the	 legislature	(in	matters	of	taxation,	where	normally	Parliament	 is	supposed	to	play	a	distinctive	role),	and	no	 judicial	 review	was	used	 by	 opponents	 to	 gain	 a	public	 forum	and	 enter	 into	 a	 constructive	discussion	 based	 on	rational	 argumentation	and	evidence	 exchanged	with	public	and	private	 actors.	This	 result	 is	especially	paradoxical	as	 in	 this	very	case	one	key	 legal	 issue	was	 the	 fear	that	private	actors	might	 use	 power	 to	 coerce	 tax	 enforcement,	 which	 would	 have	 entailed	 an	 unconstitutional	transfer	of	power	to	a	private	actor.	This	kind	of	tension	needs	to	be	mapped	by	the	law,	especially	administrative	 law,	so	 that	constructive	solutions	are	developed	to	protect	 the	ways	 in	which	public	 actors	 can	 take	 the	 necessary	 decisions	 to	 invest	 in	 infrastructure	 projects	whilst	 the	individual	freedom	of	citizens	is	duly	acknowledged.	This	would	be	a	continuation	of	the	role	it	played	at	the	turn	of	the	20th	century	when	it	sought	to	balance	public	and	private	interests	in	public	 contracts.	 Yet,	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 public	 scrutiny	 in	 France	 has	 prevented	 such	 a	development	from	happening	so	far.	This	situation	may	evolve,	however,	as	Belgium	illustrates. 
V. Belgium:	Antwerp	Oosterweel		
	One	major	mobility	problem	 in	Belgium	is	 the	 traffic	around	Antwerp.	 In	2003	projects	were	developed	to	address	this	in	a	mobility	plan,	the	so-called	Masterplan	Mobiliteit	Antwerpen	(later	known	 as	 Masterplan	 2020).80	 This	 strategy	 included	 setting	 up	 the	 Beheersmaatschappij	
Antwerpen	Mobiel	(BAM),81	an	arm’s-length	independent	public	body	that	enjoyed	wide	powers	to	 implement	 the	 necessary	 mobility	 projects.	 The	 most	 important	 project,	 the	“Oosterweelverbinding”,	 was	 the	 closing	 of	 the	 ring	 road	 around	 Antwerp.	 It	 included	 the	construction	of	a	tunnel	and	a	bridge	over	the	Schelde	river	for	more	than	3bn	EUR.	Developed	as	a	public-private	partnership,	the	project	involved	the	private	sector	in	financing,	developing,	building	and	maintaining	the	infrastructure.	Most	of	the	funding	would	come	through	BAM	thanks	to	private	financing.	The	project	costs	would	be	reimbursed	thanks	to	a	toll	fee	paid	to	BAM.	To	comply	with	European	budgetary	constraints	this	project	could	not	increase	public	debt	(the	so-called	ESR	neutrality).	Eurostat	(the	statistical	office	of	the	European	Union)	was	asked	to	issue	
ex	 ante	 opinions	 related	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 legal	 and	 financial	 structure	 designed	 for	 the	
																																																													77	The	body	closest	to	such	a	position	was	the	Agence	de	financement	des	infrastructures	de	transport	de	
France.	However,	its	budget	was	supposed	to	be	covered	by	the	ecotax	(Senate	Report	430).		78	Assemblée	report	545-6.		79	In	the	case	of	Notre-Dame-des-Landes	none	of	the	judicial	challenges	have	been	successful	so	far	(Mission	de	médiation	relative	au	projet	d’aéroport	du	Grand	Ouest,	Rapport,	2017,	Annex	6).		80	 https://www.vlaamsparlement.be/dossiers/oosterweel-masterplan-2020-bam;	 De	 Oosterweel-Saga,	
Een	onderzoek	naar	de	rol	van	burgers	bij	besluitvorming	rondom	de	Oosterweelverbinding,	Masterscriptie	Bestuurskunde,	Universiteit	van	Tilburg,	Tilburgse	School	voor	Politiek	en	Bestuur,	2012,	76p.		81	Holding	Company	Antwerp	Mobility;	Decreet	houdende	de	oprichting	van	de	naamloze	vennootschap	van	
publiek	recht	Beheersmaatschappij	Antwerpen	Mobiel	(BAM),	Official	Gazette,	19	February	2003.	
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Oosterweel	project	and	the	role	of	BAM.82	Adaptations	to	the	project	were	then	made	so	as	to	keep	it	off	the	public	balance-sheet. 
 The	procurement	process	was	started	in	July	2004.	It	met	with	intense	resistance	from	economic	actors,	citizens	and	associations.	Competitors	excluded	from	participating	disputed	the	awarding	procedure.83	Associations	and	citizens	challenged	the	route	chosen	for	the	project.84	They	relied	on	their	right	to	access	administrative	documents	so	that	they	could	collect	as	much	information	as	possible	about	the	project,	the	expert	studies	undertaken	to	design	the	route	and	the	figures	behind	 the	 project.	 They	 then	 used	 the	 information	 to	 compel	 public	 authorities	 to	 change	fundamental	 elements	 of	 the	 project.85	 Public	 resistance	 relied	 on	 smart	 communication	campaigns	(a	song	was	even	written	to	protest	against	it86),	petitions,	protests	and	other	media-savvy	techniques.	This	led	to	a	referendum	in	2009	which	showed	that	many	residents	opposed	the	bridge	being	built.	The	Flemish	administration	then	decided	to	search	for	alternatives.		
	Adapting	the	project	from	a	bridge	to	a	tunnel	meant	significant	changes	to	the	project.	This	had	far-reaching	 implications	 for	 the	 procurement	 process,	which	was	 at	 an	 advanced	 stage.	 The	preferred	bidder	had	already	submitted	a	planning	application,	which	meant	that	he	had	incurred	high	costs	and	invested	resources	to	secure	this	contract.	Under	procurement	law	legal	issues	arose	over	ascertaining	whether	the	route	could	be	adapted	and	whether	part	of	the	project	might	still	be	awarded	to	the	preferred	bidder	through	a	settlement.	These	questions	were,	however,	not	submitted	to	a	judge	but	to	the	European	Commission.	The	European	Commission	did	not	give	a	green	light	to	awarding	the	contract	to	the	preferred	bidder	under	these	circumstances.	Another	settlement	was	thus	negotiated	between	the	parties:	the	preferred	bidder	renounced	a	damages	action	amounting	to	323.9m	EUR	and	BAM	paid	him	37.19m	EUR	to	compensate	for	the	breaking	of	the	negotiations	(calculated	on	the	basis	of	an	extended	cost-benefit	analysis	of	this	project),	 and	waived	 the	 right	 to	use	 the	project	design	developed	 for	 the	 tunnel	 for	 another	5.10m	EUR.		
	Thereafter,	the	project’s	contractual	design	and	project	management	were	deeply	revised.	First,	the	 project	 was	 put	 on	 the	 market	 in	 smaller	 chunks.	 Secondly,	 public	 participation	 and	negotiations	with	associations	became	more	intense.	In	2017	a	compromise	was	reached	and	a	“future	 alliance”	 (toekomstverbond)	 agreed	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 Alexander	 D’Hooghe,	 an	architect	and	MIT	professor	tasked	with	the	covering	of	the	Antwerp	ring	road.	Further	public	participation	should	be	carried	on	in	a	new	co-operation	structure	where	associations	will	remain	partners	with	the	public	bodies.	Part	of	the	compromise	was	that	associations	withdrew	from	
																																																														82	 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/2990403/BE-advice-Stat-treatment-Oosterweel-Link-concession.pdf/2dc34a7a-716b-4aa3-b85f-fdf5602d80d5;	 http://inr-icn.fgov.be/sites/default/files/bam_3.pdf;	 http://www.bamnv.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/jaarverslag-BAM-AV-13.5.2013.pdf.			83	I.a.	C.É.b,	nr.	165.404,	30	November	2006;	nr.	166.264,	21	December	2006.		84	I.a.	C.É.b,	nr.	232.161,	11	September	2015;	nr.	217.777,	8	February	2012.		85	E.g.	C.É.b.,	nr	239.363,	11	October	2017,	Verhaeghe	and	VZW	Straatego,	regarding	the	request	to	disclose	email	exchanges	between	BAM	and	its	in-house	legal	advisor.	According	to	the	administrative	judge	these	exchanges	pertaining	to	environmental	 information	are	not	protected	by	professional	confidentiality	so	they	need	to	be	disclosed.		86	 https://www.hln.be/nieuws/binnenland/de-wappersong-protestlied-tegen-oosterweelverbinding~a556e1f9/.			
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 17.	their	pending	judicial	challenges	in	this	case.87	This	meant	that	further	judicial	control	over	the	agreements	reached	in	this	project	would	be	taken	away	so	that	the	project	could	no	longer	be	endangered	by	judicial	challenges	lodged	by	associations.		
	This	project	led	to	numerous	official	reviews.	First,	the	Flemish	Parliament	followed	up	on	this	project	with	progress	reports	over	 the	years.	At	 the	outset	 these	reports	were	rather	general.	However,	as	time	passed	they	became	more	extensive	and	probing.	The	Rekenhof	(Court	of	Audit)	also	 issued	 control	 reports	 (about	 the	 project’s	 relevancy,	 transparency	 and	 reliability)	 and	audited	the	procurement	process	 in	2007.88	Parliament	held	various	hearings.	Furthermore,	a	special	 commission	 created	 in	 2009	 considered	 the	 speeding	 up	 of	 major	 infrastructure	projects.89	Many	of	its	recommendations	were	implemented	in	the	following	years.		
	This	 overall	 dynamic	 has	 had	 far-reaching	 consequences:	 the	 problems	 that	 arose	 in	 the	
Oosterweel	and	similar	projects	resulted	in	reforms	of	proceedings	in	the	administrative	justice	system	(especially	the	Raad	voor	vergunningsbetwistingen,	an	administrative	Court	in	charge	of	adjudicating	 legal	 challenges	 pertaining	 to	 urban	 permits)	 and	 the	 administrative	 judge,	 the	
Conseil	d’Etat.90	The	overall	idea	is	that	judges	have	to	reach	fast	final	decisions:	administrative	decisions	cannot	be	quashed	on	mere	procedural	or	formal	grounds.	Therefore,	legal	techniques	such	as	the	administrative	loop	(a	procedure	where	the	judge	asks	the	administration	to	correct	a	 procedural	 defect	 under	 specific	 conditions),	 the	 limitation	 of	 standing	 to	 cases	 when	 the	claimant	has	an	effective	interest	in	the	matter	and	modulation	in	the	time	allowed	for	judicial	decisions	by	judges	have	been	recently	introduced	to	limit	the	negative	consequences	of	judicial	decisions	quashing	administrative	decisions.91					The	 Oosterweel	 illustrates	 that	 the	 administration	 considers	 that	 judicial	 intervention	 is	disturbing	and	threatening.92	For	 instance,	 the	discussion	between	the	administration	and	the	preferred	bidder	was	deliberately	kept	outside	judicial	scrutiny	through	a	settlement.	In	parallel,	the	Flemish	legislature	has	reformed	the	statute	book	to	limit	the	opportunities	for	citizens	and	associations	to	challenge	planning	permits	judicially:	a	range	of	public-private	co-operations	had	indeed	started	to	face	issues	as	citizens	and	associations	had	started	to	judicially	challenge	their	planning	 permits.93	 Judicial	 challenges	 seem,	 indeed,	 to	 have	 equipped	 associations	 with	powerful	 tools	 to	 slow	 down	 and	 resist	 projects,	 although	 judicial	 challenges	 are	 only	 one	technique	in	a	wider	toolkit.	This	project	illustrates	how	civil	society	has	become	increasingly																																																														87	http://toekomstverbond.be/.	See	C.É.b.,	nr.	239.790,	7	November	2017.		88	https://www.ccrek.be/Docs/2007_15_Oosterweelverbinding.pdf.		89	Verslag	van	de	Commissie	Investeringprojecten,	Naar	een	snellere	en	betere	besluitvorming	over	complexe	
projecten,	 available	 at	https://docs.vlaamsparlement.be/docs/biblio/opendigibib/monografie/2010/118_eindverslag_expertencommissie.pdf.				90	Wet	houdende	hervorming	van	de	bevoegdheid,	de	procedureregeling	en	de	organisatie	van	de	Raad	van	
State,	Official	Gazette,	3	February	2014.		91		F.	Viseur	and	J.	Philippart	(eds),	La	justice	administrative	(Brussels,	Larcier,	2015);	M.	Van	Damme	(ed),	
Hervorming	van	de	Raad	van	State	(Brugge,	Die	Keure,	2014).		92	 http://www.ademloos.be/nieuws/kris-peeters-wil-dat-werking-raad-van-state-wordt-aangepast;	 S.	Bekaert,	De	 Raad	 van	 State:	 Staatsgevaarlijk?	 Over	 heden,	 verleden	 en	 toekomst	 van	 het	 administratief	
contentieux	 Openingsrede	 gerechtelijk	 jaar	 2012-2013,	 available	 at:	 http://simonbekaert.be/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Openingsrede-21-09-2012.pdf.			93	Decreet	houdende	wijziging	van	diverse	bepalingen	 inzake	ruimtelijke	ordening,	milieu	en	omgeving,	8	December	2017,	Official	Gazette,	20	December	2017.	
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 18.	articulate:	it	knows	its	rights	and	has	learned	how	to	make	them	effective.	This	also	strikingly	shows	that	citizens	are	searching	for	ways	to	voice	their	positions	about	the	common	good	(or	general	 interest),	 about	 which	 public	 bodies	 are	 usually	making	 decisions.	 Once	 citizens	 are	listened	to,	they	are	then	happy	to	let	go	of	their	resistance	in	Belgium.	For	instance,	associations	have	agreed	to	commit	themselves	to	the	“future	alliance”	with	public	bodies	while	setting	aside	judges	and	the	potential	protection	that	they	may	offer	to	their	legal	entitlements.		
VI. Tensions	in	public-private	co-operation:	comparing	judicial	roles		This	paper	analysed	the	increasing	wide	role	that	private	actors	take	over	in	public-private	co-operations	such	as	major	infrastructure	projects	through	three	case	studies,	the	HS2,	Ecomouv’	and	Oosterweel.	In	these	long-term	contracts	public	bodies	take	a	step	back,	entrusting	private	actors	with	extensive	missions	such	as	expropriation	(e.g.	HS2)	and	tax	collection	(e.g.	Ecomouv’).	Public	bodies	 then	seek	 to	develop	monitoring	systems	to	ensure	 that	private	actors	perform	their	contractual	obligations.	As	the	financial	stakes	of	these	complex	arrangements	are	high,	new	techniques	for	organising	the	public-private	relationships	and	addressing	uprising	legal	issues	are	designed.		This	paper	sought	to	map	the	role	of	 judges	in	adjudicating	these	legal	issues	arising	between	public-private	actors	and	from	citizens’	opposition	to	major	transport	infrastructure	projects	in	three	European	countries:	England,	France	and	Belgium.	Its	main	aim	was	to	analyse	how	judges’	role	may	have	been	affected	 following	general	 trends	 in	administrative	changes,	such	as	neo-liberal	approaches	to	public	intervention	in	the	economy	and	Europeanisation.	The	case	studies	have	 pinpointed	 how	 the	 general	 context	 within	 which	 major	 infrastructure	 projects	 are	implemented	is	shaped	by	legal	norms	which	are	increasingly	finding	their	sources	outside	the	domestic	legal	system	and	inside	the	European	Union.	These	legal	norms	find	their	application	in	close	 connection	 to	 domestic	 administrative	 law	 procedures	 (e.g.	 environmental	 assessment,	public	procurement,	Eurovignette,	budgetary	constraints),	however.	This	general	context	is	also	changing	as	better	 education	of	 citizens	and	 technological	 development	 (e.g.	 the	 Internet	 and	social	media)	influence	citizens’	expectations	and	uses	of	their	rights.	How	do	judges	police	the	tensions	 arising	 from	 public-private	 co-operation	 and	 complex	 long-term	 contractual	relationships?	These	conclusions	map	them	from	a	comparative	perspective	in	two	steps:	firstly,	by	 showing	 how	 limited	 the	 judges’	 role	 is	 within	 the	 overall	 accountability	 framework	surrounding	public	 action	 in	 all	 three	 legal	 systems;	 secondly,	 by	 showing	 that,	 despite	 these	limitations,	each	national	system	 is	maintaining	a	core	role	 for	 judges,	very	much	echoing	 the	main	traditional	role	of	judges	in	each	of	the	three	legal	systems.		A	major	common	trend	across	the	three	case	studies	is	the	limited	role	judges	play	in	the	overall	accountability	 system.	 Judges	 are	not	 equipped	 to	 adjudicate	on	 complex	polycentric	matters	involving	economic,	legal,	managerial	and	social	stakes	altogether.	These	complex	matters	indeed	fall,	by	their	very	nature,	more	within	the	political	realm	than	the	legal	one.	Therefore,	alternative	routes	are	trodden	by	citizens.	Other	preventive	or	curative,	formal	and	informal	techniques	are	developed.	Protests,	petitions,	public	consultations,	complaints	 to	ombudsmen	etc.	are	widely	used,	as	well	as	relying	on	Parliament,	audit	courts	and	a	myriad	of	smaller	bodies	(formal	and	informal).	Overall,	 judges	do	not	play	a	leading	role	in	the	accountability	system.	In	theory	EU	procurement	directives	 are	deemed	 to	 expand	 judicial	 control	 over	procurement	procedures.	National	 legislatures	 seek	 to	 reduce	 overall	 access	 to	 judges,	 however.	 In	England	a	 range	of	measures	have	been	taken	to	that	effect	such	as	the	drastic	reduction	in	legal	aid	following	the	financial	crisis	or	the	reform	of	judicial	review	from	2013	onwards.94	In	Belgium	new	conditions	
																																																														94		See	e.g.:	Reform	of	judicial	review:	The	government	response	[2013	Cm	8611].	
2018.01.22	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 19.	have	been	 introduced	 for	residents	under	which	 they	are	allowed	to	challenge	environmental	planning	permits.	However,	differences	appear	between	the	case	studies	regarding	the	level	at	which	accountability	is	sought	and	the	nature	of	techniques	developed	to	address	conflicts,	revealing	the	distinctive	features	of	each	administrative	system.	Regarding	the	accountability	level,	the	HS2	illustrates	the	importance	of	engaging	at	the	community	level	in	England	to	find	local	solutions	on	the	basis	of	local	needs,	within	a	central	framework	where	financial	and	technical	expertise	is	available.	In	France	 Ecomouv’	 illustrates	 the	 discrepancy	 between	 local	 demands	 and	 the	 national	accountability	 system,	 deprived	 of	 robust	 institutional	 expertise.	 In	 Belgium	 Oosterweel	illustrates	how	European	institutions	are	resorting	to	sorting	out	technical,	 financial	and	legal	matters.	Regarding	 the	 legal	 techniques	developed	to	address	conflicts,	 the	prevention	of	conflicts	and	informal	 resolution	 systems	 receive	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 attention	 in	 England.	 In	 France	 the	situation	is	more	conflictual	and	political	protest	is	heavily	relied	on.	In	Belgium	recent	examples	show	a	changing	mindset	when	it	comes	to	conflict	management	and	prevention.	When	conflicts	happen	 the	 administrative	 judge	 is	 equipped	with	 new	 tools	 (e.g.	 the	 administrative	 loop	 or	mediation)	to	seek	constructive	solutions	and	not	to	merely	quash	administrative	decisions.				If	judges’	role	is	overall	limited	they	do,	however,	retain	a	distinctive	role	in	addressing	tensions	between	public-private	co-operation	and	public	opposition:	they	act	as	guardians	ensuring	that	administrative	decision-making	and	political	trade-offs	occur	within	the	procedures,	standards	and	principles	set	by	the	law.	The	three	case	studies	bring	out	the	three	main	legal	issues	that	are	submitted	 to	 judges;	 namely,	 freedom	 of	 information,	 environmental	 assessment	 and	 public	procurement.	Here	national	distinctiveness	remains	strong.	In	England	the	ordinary	judge	comes	into	play.	His	main	role	is	to	ensure	that	citizens	and	associations	are	equipped	with	the	necessary	tools	to	make	their	position	known	within	the	political	process,	which	is	agreed	to	be	working	properly.	When	appropriate	 information	 is	within	the	public	domain	 it	 is	submitted	to	public	rational	debates,	ensuring	that	political	choices	are	made.	Judges	refrain	from	entering	political	adjudication.	 In	 France	 the	 administrative	 judge	 decides	 on	 the	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 major	infrastructure	projects,	especially	ensuring	that	the	decision-making	process	is	impartial	and	not	biased	by	private	actors.	In	Belgium	the	Conseil	d’Etat	is	the	first	port	of	call	and	also	ensures	that	administrative	documents	are	disclosed.	Regional	environmental	courts	are	now	also	involved.	The	ordinary	 judiciary	keeps	 its	 role	 in	 adjudicating	 contractual	 disputes	 in	 the	performance	phase,	and	may	be	called	on	 to	do	so	more	 than	before	because	relationships	between	public	bodies	and	citizens	and	between	economic	actors	and	associations	are	increasingly	regulated	by	contracts.	Despite	these	differences,	though,	efficient	decision-making	and	judicial	decisions	are	paramount.95		
	Overall,	this	limited	case	law	might	be	enough	for	legal	scholarship	to	build	a	broader	framework	for	 policing	 tensions	 between	 public-private	 co-operation	 and	 public	 opposition	 to	 major	infrastructure	projects.	As	in	classic	administrative	law	judges	can	only	decide	incrementally	and	pragmatically	on	the	matters	submitted	to	them.	However,	scholarship	can	build	on	this	case	law	to	provide	a	conceptual	toolkit	framing	administrative	decision-making.	Today,	it	has	to	develop	this	 by	 ensuring	 that	 judicial	 scrutiny	 guarantees	 a	 safe	 discursive	 space	 to	 citizens	 and	associations,	answering	technical	questions	such	as	the	general	methodologies	that	public	bodies	have	to	follow	to	evidence	their	choices,	and	(re)gaining	the	public’s	trust	in	these	matters.	
																																																														95	 E.g.:	 France:	 C.É.fr.,	Danthony,	 23	 Decembre	 2011,	 commented	 on	 in	Grands	 arrêts	 de	 jurisprudence	
administrative	(19th	edn,	Paris	Dalloz	2013)	nr	118;	Belgian	administrative	loop.	
